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Abstract 
 
Over the decades, the traditional condemnation of slavery has been based not only 
on philosophical argumentation and moral values, but also on the conjecture that 
slavery was inefficient. This position led to one of the most passionate debates in 
economic history on the efficiency of the US slave market. This question of 
efficiency has not been analyzed on the slave market in Korea. 
The aim of this paper is to analyze the efficiency of the Korean slave market by 
examining the behavior of slave prices during the period 1689-1893. In order to 
do so, we collected long-run series of slave prices from nationwide surveys of 
more than 25 public and private historical records. We then tested whether the 
slave market was efficient using the arbitrage asset equation. We found slavery to 
have been efficient most of the time. 
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I. Introduction 
The traditional condemnation of slavery has been based not only on philosophical 
argumentation and moral values, but also on the conjecture that slavery was inefficient. This 
position led to one of the most passionate debates in economic history, where on the one hand, 
Conrad and Meyer (1958) as well as Fogel and Engerman (1974) claimed that slavery was 
efficient, while many others, especially David and Temin (1979), claimed otherwise. 
This debate on the US slave market led us to test whether the nineteenth-century slave 
market in other parts of the world was also (in)efficient. Moreover, since there is a renewal of 
interest in the economic history of Asian countries, particularly the newly industrialized 
countries, in this paper we will focus on this question in the context of the Korean economy. 
This paper is a first attempt to shed light on the Korean slave market, and more specifically, our 
aim is to analyze the efficiency of this market. 
We are going to use a technique that differs somewhat from those proposed until now: We 
will use the arbitrage asset equation. Indeed, many theories -- from the principal-agent theory to 
the analysis of labor markets -- have been put to scrutiny on the efficiency of the US slave 
market. One theory has not been used: The asset price theory, and more specifically the arbitrage 
asset equation. This paper will show that grosso modo, the slave market was efficient in Korea. 
Our paper will focus on the slave market in Korea during the period 1689-1893. The slave 
market, like other markets, started expanding at the time of the introduction of money to Korea 
in 1689. Therefore, we start analyzing the slave market at this time. It should be noted that from 
ancient times until the 20th century, Korea was an agricultural economy, and until 1689 was even 
not monetized (although already in 1678, for the first time ever, the coin money had been 
introduced and circulated in Korea).  
From this period onwards, markets started developing; the introduction of money and a 
growing population leads to the development of markets along with a growing volume of 
transactions, and in consequence, the market for slaves begins to expand. It is interesting to note 
that in the Korean population of 15.8 million in the late 17th century, nearly a quarter was made 
up of slaves who worked in the agricultural sector (see Maddison 2001). In consequence, land, 
slaves, and labor services began to be sold in the markets systematically. 
  3
Economic research on slavery in Korea is scarce and has mainly focused either on Korea’s 
social and legal system, or on demographics and the proportion of slaves in the population.1 This 
paper focuses on the economics of this market, and will therefore present new series of data 
thereon. 
The purpose of this paper is to analyze the Korean slave market and to test whether it was 
efficient from the time of the appearance of money in 1689 until the demise of slavery in 1894. 
This paper is a first attempt to present an empirical analysis on the price of slaves in Korea, and 
for doing so, new data has been compiled and at the same time, we use a differing technique than 
that used in analyzing the US slave market. 
In the next section, we present a short history of the Korean slave market. In section III, we 
discuss the Korean slave economy and display the data that we have gathered on slave 
transactions during this period. In part IV, we apply the arbitrage assets equation to the Korean 
slave market. In order to analyze whether the Korean slave market was efficient during the 
period 1689-1893, it was necessary to also gather data on wages, productivity, and rice prices, 
which are presented in section III. Section V concludes. 
 
II. A Concise History of the Slave Market in Korea 
Slave markets in East Asia were common, and Korea was no different than its neighbors. 
There is evidence of slavery in China as early as the Jin era (BCE 221-207), and in Korea, 
slavery dated as far back as the Three Kingdoms period (57 BCE-668 CE). Koreans were made 
slaves of other Koreans during the war between the Three Kingdoms, beginning with prisoners 
of wars between the states.2  Over time, slaves became part of the Korean caste-status system, 
wherein slaves had a clear economic place. 
  Indeed, Korean society was very traditional and was divided into four hereditary groups. 
The Yangban were the elites; they were landowners who collected rents for themselves, and 
were tax-exempt. The second class was the Chungin; it was the middle class consisting of 
accountants, high-ranking soldiers, merchants, and magistrates. The third class was the 
commoners, or Sangmin, consisting of farmers and free laborers, who were subject to high taxes, 
                                                          
1 Palais (1996) and Patterson (1982) focus on the slavery system during the Joseon Korea, while Shikata (1938), 
Chong (1983), Han (1977), Choi (1974),  Han (1982), and  Lee (1998) focus on the demographics of slavery. 
2 In Appendix A, we present succinctly the various periods in Korean History. 
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rent for lands, and military conscription. The forth class, the Nobi, were the slaves, who made up 
a large portion of the total population, between 25% to 40% depending on the period. The Nobi 
did not pay taxes, nor did they serve in the army. While the government owned many slaves 
(450,000 in 1467), slaves were also privately owned by the Yangban. Wealthy families 
commonly owned around 50 slaves per family, and some Confucian academies had over 700 
slaves registered. 
There was also an intermediate class between the Sangmin and the Nobi, the Chonmin. The 
Chonmin, like the Sangmin, were free and were not slaves, but they worked in jobs that the 
Sangmin would not, such as butchers, sailors, and plasterers, and resided in their own family 
groups outside the towns. When this class disappeared during the Joseon dynasty, the majority 
became Sangmin, yet some became slaves (Nobi). Our work focuses on the Nobi, who were 
bought and sold in the markets during the 18th-19th century, and on whom we collected data. 
The Korean slave market did not develop until the late 17th century. In fact, markets in 
general in Korea were not very developed until the appearance of money in 1689. Until then, 
slaves were not frequently sold; free men might even become slaves to avoid penury. 
The status of Korean slaves changed over time. During the first period, slaves were either 
former prisoners of wars between tribes or nations, or criminals, and they were publicly owned. 
Slaves began to be privately owned during the Han Chinese era (BCE 206-CE 8), when the 
government bestowed its public slaves upon the noble class. From this period on, slavery became 
a punishment for criminal behavior, or when parents were forced by circumstances to sell their 
children into slavery.3   Moreover, commoners could fall into slavery due to private debts. 
However, during the Sung China (960-1279), the privilege of owning slaves was granted only to 
the noble class, and commoners could not own slaves. 
As the market developed and coin money was introduced in 1689, slaves began to be bought 
and sold privately and systematically in Joseon Korea. The slave sector engendered massive 
regulation on the status of children as well as on the rights of owning them. There were conflicts 
among the ruling classes, and between the government and the ruling classes, over slavery policy, 
since the number of slaves could increase or decrease depending on their legal status. The 
                                                          
3 This differs slightly from the African slaves, wherein the manner of enslavement was usually kidnapping. Indeed, 
Nunn and Wantchekon (2008) refer to Koelle’s inventory showing that regarding methods of enslavement, 24% 
were taken in war; 40% were kidnapped or seized; 16% were acquired via a judicial process, and 19% were sold or 
tricked by a relative or acquaintance. 
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literature stresses that slaves were also part of the dowry, or given as wedding gifts (see 
Patterson 1982). 
Most regulation was on the status of children of slaves. The strictest rule was that slaves’ 
children follow the status of their parents (the Jongchon law), i.e., children were slaves if one of 
their parents was a slave, regardless of the status of the other parent. 
In 1397, the first government of the Joseon dynasty (established in 1392) needed more tax 
revenue in order to strengthen its power. In consequence, it changed the slavery policy in order 
to increase the number of commoners who could pay taxes. The Jongyang law stated that 
children were common if their mother was common, regardless of the status of the father. This 
change in slavery policy did not please the ruling class, the Yangban, because the number of 
slaves decreased on the basis of this law.4  In 1430, the slavery policy reverted to the previous 
system in order to secure more slaves for the agriculture sector.5 In consequence, after 1430, 
numbers of slaves increased until 1731. In 1731, the status law changed again due to social and 
economic structural changes. This policy change could explain the decrease in numbers of 
slaves after 1731. Slavery ended in 1894 by enactment of a law (gapo) abolishing it. It is 
interesting to note that the abolition of slavery was a common phenomenon throughout the 
world during the 19th century (see Table 1). 
 
III. The Slave Economy 
 
1. The Slave population 
Several important studies have been conducted on the slave population in Korea, all in 
Korean except two in English, those of Palais and Patterson.6 Palais’ (1996) was the first article 
on Korean slavery and the slave population written in English. His data on the Korean slave 
population is based on H. Shikata (1938) and S. Chong (1983). Patterson (1982) provides a 
general overview of Korea’s social and economic system, including slavery during the 18th-19th 
centuries.  
                                                          
4 See  Choi  (1978) and Ji (1995) for changes in slavery policy for this period . 
5 See Hong (1981) for changes in the slave population during the Joseon dynasty. 
6 See footnote (1). See also Pyung (1982), Y. Park (1986, 2007), and Jeon (1989) for slavery policy in the late 
Joseon Dynasty.    
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The main work on the slave population is that of Shikata (1938), who collected data of 
household tally registrations by class from the Daegu area in Kyungsang province. He showed 
that the proportion of slaves in the Korean population went from 43% in 1690 to 15% in 1789 
and back to 31% in 1858 (see Table 2).7  
In Table 3, we present the various series on the slave proportion of the Korean population in 
areas of Kyungsang province. It is clear that there is a wide variance among regions and periods 
in the percentages of the slave population, though in most areas, it decreases over time.8   
2. Slave Transactions and slave prices  
The literature on slave transactions and prices is nearly non-existent, except for the works of 
Chong (1983) and Lee (1981). Chong’s (1983) was the first attempt to build series of slave 
prices. He displays 143 observations for the 18th and 19th centuries from a single historical 
source named GyujangGak, which is an official nationwide record made by the central 
government. The second study, that of Lee (1981), presents only 17 slave transactions in 
Kyungsang province for the 17th and 18th centuries. Lee’s data was from Kyungsang province 
only. Recently, Kim (2005) reported series of prices for self-selling slaves using the same data as 
Chong’s (1983). 
In this paper, we construct long-run series of slave prices from a nationwide survey of more 
than 25 public and private historical records, which enables examining the efficiency of the slave 
market. We first present the data on slave transactions, and then the prices of slaves. 
 A. Slave transactions and their characteristics  
Slave transactions took place in all regions of Korea. Based on historical records, we present 
in Appendix B a list of the 634 slave transactions that took place during the period 1689-1893.9 
This new data enables us to perform analytical and empirical analyses on slave prices, which was 
not possible when we had only 160 observations based on Chong (1983) and Lee (1981). 
Table 4 describes the numbers of transactions for each period.10   Note that slave trade 
                                                          
7  During the Joseon dynasty, Korea was divided into eight provinces: Kyungsang (southeast) and Cheonla 
(southwest) were the main agricultural sectors. Kyungki, Chungcheong, and Kangwon were located in central 
Korea; and three other provinces, Hwanghae, Pyungan, and Hamkyung, were in the northern part of Korea.  
8 Investigating the slave population in Kyungsang province before 1690, Han (1982) showed that the ratio of slaves 
was 39.5% in Danseong in 1606; and Choi (1974) pointed out that the ratio of slaves was 14.3% in SanEum in 1630. 
9 The second and third columns in Appendix B show the number and age of slaves by gender respectively. The 
fourth and fifth columns show the price per slave and the total sum of the slave transaction. The sixth column 
presents the code related to the specific sources listed at the end of Appendix B. 
10 We are aware that the number of transactions that took place during this period is higher than our sample. 
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increased after 1690, a period wherein money was used nationwide and commodity markets 
began to develop.11   
The data presented in Table 4 shows that female slaves were more frequently traded than 
were men, a trend that got stronger during the 19th century. Moreover, the average age of slaves 
sold during the entire period is 18. There is not a great variance over the centuries (see Appendix 
B). In conclusion, it appears that over time, slave transactions were mostly of women and young 
people.12   
It is interesting to note that while the proportion of the slave population decreased, as shown 
in Table 3, slave trade became more active during the 18th century and through the early 19th 
century. The diminishing slave population seems to be closely related to the change in slavery 
policy engendered by the Jongyang law enacted in 1731.13 At the end of the 19th century, slave 
trade decreased, a phenomenon closely related to the disappearance of the slave markets in 1894. 
Our data presented in Appendix B also provides information on the location of some of the 
transactions.14 Slave transactions in Kyungsang (southeast) and Cheonla (southwest) provinces 
represented 93.9% of the total transactions, while in Seoul and Kyungki (the capital and its 
provincial area) transactions comprised 1.4% of the total. The reason why most transactions took 
place in the southern parts of Korea is that these regions were the main agricultural sectors, and 
slaves worked mainly on farms. Most of the ruling class (the Yangban) residing in the capital 
area owned farmland in these two provinces. 
 
B. Nominal and Real Slave prices  
We gathered records on slave prices from GyuJangGak as well as from private records in 
Kyungsang, Cheonla, and all other provinces.15   Chong (1983) and Y. Lee (1998) indicated that 
slave prices decreased rapidly in the 1690s as compared to previous periods. Slave prices were 
                                                          
11 We also gathered some 50 transactions from the period 1423-1689. Transactions before 1689 were rare, since 
coin currency was not yet in use.   
12 See H. Kim and J. Lee (2006) for the development of the slave market in Korea.   
13 Despite the continuous decrease in the slave population in the Kyungsang region, there was a huge increase in the 
slave population in the Daegu area around 1858, leading to a fierce debate among historians regarding the causes 
thereof.    
14 In fact, for 148 cases of a total of 285 cases reported (which represent 634 transactions), we have information on 
the location. 
15 See appendix B. The data from the GyuJangGak source is named "data source", in order to distinguish these data 
from the other sources. 
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officially set to about 100 nyang (unit of currency) by a Law of Sok-Daejeon.16 This level of 
slave prices was maintained on average until money was introduced. From then until the 19th 
century, slave prices began to decrease and became volatile. 
 Our yearly data on slave prices are presented in Appendix C, column 1. In Table 5, we 
present average prices and average changes in slave prices. Slave prices increased by 0.20% 
annually for the entire period. Slave prices were relatively stable over the various periods, and 
their standard deviation did not vary much. The average price of a slave was about 16 nyang 
during the 18th and 19th centuries -- much lower than those of the 17th century (see Table 5). 
Slave prices display six secular trends. As shown in Table 5, during three periods, we see a 
rise in the prices, and in other periods, there is a decrease. The average prices for males and 
females differ, and are presented in Table 5, columns 1 and 2. It is interesting to note that the 
prices for women were higher than for men, indicating that women were more valuable than 
were men, probably due to childbearing. Over time and gradually, free workers entered the 
farming sector, performing work that in the past had been done by male slaves. 
Nominal prices of slaves are presented in figure 1a, based on the series presented in Appendix 
B.17 The price of rice is our proxy for the price level. Rice was the main product as well as a 
representative consumption good in the Joseon Korea.18 Rice has also been sometimes used as a 
medium of exchange along with bronze-cash. Quoted as money value (nyang per suk of rice), the 
price of rice was mainly obtained from the Kyungsang area, the southern Korea, in order to 
maintain regional consistency with productivity data. 19  The price of rice is presented in 
Appendix C, column 2 and in figure 1b. 
Figure 1c depicts the real price of slaves. Over time, there was a decrease in the price of 
slaves. A reasonable explanation for this fall in slave prices is the increase in monitoring cost of 
slaves, as we will discuss in the next section. 
  
                                                          
16 Before the introduction of coin money as a means of transactions, slave prices were quoted in terms of silver and 
fabrics (commodity money). To convert slave prices into currency, we used these conversion terms: 1 unit of silver 
= 4 nyang; 1 unit of fabric (seung) = 2 nyang. For more details on conversion rates, see H. Kim and Lee (2006). 
17 We used the price of a normalized slave, whose price we developed using the technique of “hand equivalent” 
used by Fogel and Engerman. 
18 See  J.Lee (1997) and H.Lee (1996) for a study on the price of rice. 
19 See J. Lee (1999) and D. Ko (1998) for the development of commodity markets in Joseon Korea. The suk is the 
unit of rice at this period and is around 178 liters (4.96 bushels) of rice.  
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C. Wages and Productivity of Slaves   
In the next section in which we analyze the arbitrage equation of the slaves, we use two series 
related to the slave market: wages of free workers, who are an alternative to slaves and the 
productivity of slaves. 
The series of the average production of rice per slave is a proxy for slave productivity. We 
used data of two different areas of Kyungsang province to build the series of slave productivity. 
The first area is Kyungsang-ChilGok for the 17th-18th century, and the other is Kyungsang-
Yeachon for the 19th century.20 Slave productivity for the latter was not obtained directly from 
the historical records, since the latter contained data on land productivity only. We recalculated 
slave productivity by multiplying the productivity of a unit of land (doolak) and the size of plots 
cultivated by slaves for this period. We assumed that a worker could farm three doolaks as 
reported in the old records of Kyungsang-ChilGok for the 18th century. 
Figures 2a and b display the wages and productivity series. Wages of free workers did not 
display much of volatility, while productivity of slaves did. This difference between these two 
series can be explained in many different ways, from rigidity in wages to changes in weather. 
We now turn to analyze the efficiency of the slave market, and will discuss further the data on 
wages and productivity. 
 
IV. Efficient Slave markets and the Arbitrage Asset Equation 
 
Efficiency was one of the main subjects of debate over the slave market in the US. There were 
many facets to analyzing this problem: Some have studied efficiency in terms of profitability, 
i.e., these studies have focused on the question of whether farms using slave labor were 
estimated to have been more profitable than those using free workers. 
 Another way of analyzing the efficiency of the slave market was to check whether the 
purchase of a slave was a profitable investment that yielded returns comparable to those in 
investment in manufacturing. Related to that question, some have asked about the productivity of 
the slave and if the slave was more efficient and harder working than his or her free counterpart. 
Conrad and Meyer (1958) and Fogel and Engerman (1974) showed that slave productivity was 
                                                          
20 See W.Lee (2001) for the productivity in the Kyungsang -Yeachon area and G.Kim (1996) for the productivity in 
the Kyungsang-ChilGok area.   
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higher than that of free workers for this period, although David and Temin (1979) argued that 
slave productivity in the antebellum (US) South has been overestimated by measurement errors. 
 Another question related to efficiency regards the relative efficiency of slave agriculture as 
compared to free agriculture. Fogel and Engerman (1974, p. 5) claimed that: “Economies of 
large-scale operation, effective management…made southern slave agriculture 35% more 
efficient than the northern system of family farming”. 
 Our way of testing efficiency differs: We will use the asset price theory to test the efficiency 
of the slave market. Indeed, this theory has not been applied to slave markets, although based on 
how the slave markets behaved, this theory should be adopted for analyzing them, as it has been 
for other assets. 
 The arbitrage asset equation (see Blanchard and Fischer, 1989) states that each asset which 
can be bought and sold and which gives an annual dividend of λ can be priced in the following 
way: 
 
ss dPrP += λ , (1) 
 
where Ps is the asset price (which in our case is the price of slaves), λ the yearly dividends, r 
the interest rate, and dPs, the change in price during the year.     
The dividend an individual gets from buying and keeping a slave is equal to his net revenue 
from the work of the slave. That is: 
   
CVMPtscosPMP LRL −=−=λ   (2) 
  
where MPL is the marginal product of slave work, PR is the price of the output (which in our 
case is rice, since it was the main agricultural output), and VMPL is the value of the marginal 
product.21 The costs, C, comprise mainly two elements: the variable costs of having a slave, 
which is mainly food consumption, Cf and also the costs of monitoring the slaves, Cm. 
The arbitrage equation can be rewritten in the following form: 
 
                                                          
21 Since under Korean law, offspring of slaves were also slaves, a slave was therefore an infinite lived asset. 
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)CC(dPVMPrP mfsLs +−+= . (3) 
 
In case the right hand side is lower than the left hand side, the benefit of holding slaves 
disappears. On the other hand if it is bigger, then more slaves should be bought.22 
In consequence, if the arbitrage asset equation holds for the slave market, we should have that 
there is no trend in the difference between the two sides of equation (3).23 In other words, we 
should find that B is not different than zero in the following equation: 
 
fsLs C)dPVMP(rPGwhereBtAG ++−=ε++=  (4) 
 
G is presented in Figure 3a.24  It is interesting to note that after 1800, G becomes negative, 
which can be explained by the increase in the costs of monitoring slaves. Indeed ε consists of a 
random noise and the monitoring costs, which a priori should stay stable over the period studied. 
We check by regressing equation (4) if this is indeed the case. 
The regressions of equation (4) are presented in Tables 6A and B. We present the regressions 
with different interest rates moving from 10% to 30%. The change in the interest rate does not 
influence the significance of the results.   While B is not significantly different from 0 for the 
18th century, it is so for the 19th century.  
The reduction of G in the 19th century is due to the increase of monitoring costs during this 
period. Slaves began resisting the slavery system due to the development of markets and the 
expansion of the market for free laborers. The development of commodities markets, the 
introduction of small farming management, and some urbanization provided a social 
environment that offered an incentive for slaves to flee. From a slave owner’s point of view, the 
main reason monitoring costs were so high at the juncture wherein slaves could find work as 
laborers is that catching runaway slaves was difficult. In contrast to the US, slave flight in Korea 
was easy, as in the former case, the appearance of blacks was visually distinct from that of 
                                                          
22 The VMPL graph is presented in figure 2c. Due to increases in the price of rice, the VMPL increases during the 
19th century. 
23 See Blanchard and Fischer, 1989, p. 238. 
24 The average yearly per capita consumption of rice was around two suk (see Kim and Lee 1998). Therefore the 
costs of foods are: 2Pr. Moreover, interest rates fluctuated between 10% and 50%, and the graph in Figure 3 depicts 
G when the interest rate is 20% (see Kim and Lee 1998 for series on interest rates in Korea). 
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whites, making it difficult for American slaves to flee and hide. In Korea, the slaves’ appearance 
was the same as that of the commoners, so after a slave fled from its owners’ town, s/he could 
settle somewhere else without being noticed.25 
 According to historical records, fleeing Korean slaves caused a severe social problem in the 
19th century.26  So in the end of the 19th century, the slave market gradually disappeared: prices 
of slaves went down, and the free workers were a good substitute. 
In conclusion, these tables show that the efficiency of the slave market holds for the 18th 
century, and also in the 19th century since monitoring costs have increased during the 19th 
century. 
Another way to check if indeed arbitrage asset equation holds would be to check this equation 
with wages instead of the value of marginal product. In case the productivity of free workers and 
slaves are equal, and since in a competitive economy, wages of free workers equals the net value 
of marginal product, then: 
)CC(VMPw mfL +−= . (5) 
 
Since the net value of marginal product equals the value minus the costs of having a slave. 
The arbitrage regression becomes then:  
 
)dPw(rPFwhereBtAF ss +−=ε++=  (6) 
 
F is presented in Figure 3b. In this case we see no trend in the residual. The regression results 
of equation (6) are presented in Table 7.27  The difference between the wages and the value of 
the marginal product is that the former already includes the costs of monitoring, since free 
workers have no need of monitoring, while slave without monitoring will not work efficiently 
(see Fenoaltea, 1984).  
 In summary, we find that the residual of the efficient market equation was nearly constant 
over this period, although it increases during the last period. This residual is a proxy for the 
monitoring costs in the case that the asset equation holds. The increase in the last period of our 
                                                          
25 Shaping specific physical signs on slaves to make them distinct was forbidden by Confucianism. 
26 See Chung (1983) for more details on the fleeing of slaves. 
27 Wages displayed in Appendix C were multiplied by 12 for consistency between all variables.  
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sample in the residual can be explained by the fact that Korean slaveholders’ monitoring costs 
increased due to flight, resistance, and sabotage on the part of slaves. It is interesting to note that 
when we introduce wages of free workers in lieu of the net value of marginal product, we obtain 
that efficiency holds during the entire period, even when slave prices significantly dropped. 
Indeed, the regression results indicate that B is not statistically significant at the 5 % level in 
estimation of (6). It appears that there is no time trend for the arbitrage relationship. However, 
costs including the monitoring cost exist, and are trivial neither in magnitude nor in sign. 
 
V. Conclusion 
 
The slave market in the US has been analyzed on many levels, from the treatment of slaves, 
and the deterrence of growth to the rate of returns to slavery. Despite the debate being based on 
facts, data, and theory, and undeniably the work of Fogel and Engerman is a seminal cliometric 
work; nevertheless the debate has slid quite rapidly to a philosophical debate on the negative and 
positive aspects of slavery.  
One of the questions the least philosophical or based on moral issues has been the question of 
the efficiency of the slave market.  This paper, which is a first attempt to analyze the slave 
market in Korea has therefore focused on this question -- the efficiency of the Korean slave 
market.  In this paper, we constructed long run series of slave (Nobi) prices from nationwide 
survey of more than 25 different public and private historical records. The collecting period of 
1689-1893 is nearly exactly from the time of the appearance of legal bronze cash until the total 
disappearance of slavery. Our data on slave trade includes information on gender, age, prices, 
and numbers of transactions. 
Data on slave trade were rare before the 16th century. The number of slave transactions 
increased rapidly after 1690, when money began to be used nationwide and commodities 
markets began to develop. Slaves began to be recognized as a commodity, just like land and 
other commodities.   
We can draw a few interesting results from comparing the slave markets between 19th-
century Joseon Korea and the antebellum South of the US, the main of which is that net 
productivity and actual slave prices decreased in Joseon Korea for this period, while not so in the 
American south. This drop in Korean slave prices and productivity is mainly attributed to the 
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increase in monitoring costs of slaves due to changes in the Korean economy. 
Large plantation farming management was common in the antebellum South of the US, which 
enabled the slaveholders to control their slaves to work efficiently. Moreover, the slaves could 
have their family at their own home belonging to the plantation. This arrangement might have 
deterred American slaves from fleeing from and from resisting their masters. 
The rate of return of slaves in the antebellum South of the US was not lower than that of any 
other asset; indeed, demand for slaves even increased. In contrast to the experience of the 
southern US., the Korean small farming method and the fact that Korean slaves’ appearances did 
not differ from those of free persons impeded means of controlling slaves to work efficiently in 
Joseon Korea. Therefore, slavery gradually disappeared even before the Gapo law, which 
brought an end to Korean slavery in 1894. 
Indeed, when farmers compared the benefit of holding slaves to the cost of maintaining them, 
they sold and replaced slaves for free laborers when the productivity of slaves went down and 
the cost of holding them increased. However, during the period that slaves were sold, the slave 
market was efficient. 
Regarding the question of the economic moribundity of slavery on the eve of its demise, it is 
clear that the Korean situation differed widely from that of the US. From the data we have 
presented, it appears that relative to wages in the free market, it became too costly to hold slaves 
in Korea; the height of the monitoring costs likely brought slavery to its end. 
One could also ask about the effects of slavery on economic development. However, this 
question is irrelevant for Korea, since the development of Korea began only in the 20th century. 
Yet, slavery in particular and the entire caste system might indeed take its toll on development. 
In conclusion, since this paper presents new data on slave prices, our hope is that it will trigger 
new research on the slave markets in East Asia. 
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Table 1. A Chronology of Emancipation in the World, 1772-1900 
1775 Slavery abolished in Madeira 
1804 Slavery abolished in Haiti 
1813 Gradual Emancipation in Argentina 
1814 Gradual Emancipation in Colombia 
1823 Slavery abolished in Chile 
1824 Slavery abolished in Central America 
1829 Slavery abolished in Mexico 
1831 Slavery abolished in Bolivia 
1838 Slavery abolished in all British Colonies 
1842 Slavery abolished in Uruguay 
1848 Slavery abolished in all French and Danish Colonies 
1851 Slavery abolished in Ecuador 
1854 Slavery abolished in Peru and Venezuela 
1863 Slavery abolished in all Dutch Colonies 
1865 Slavery abolished in the US 
1873 Slavery abolished in Puerto Rico 
1886 Slavery abolished in Cuba 
1888 Slavery abolished in Brazil 
1894 Slavery abolished  in Korea 
Source: Fogel and Engerman (1974), Table 1. 
 
 
 
Table 2. Population by classes in the Daegu area of the Kyungsang province    
 year Ruling class 
(Yangban) 
Commoners and 
others* 
Slaves 
(Nobi) 
Total 
Population 
1690 
1732 
1789 
1858 
1,027      (7.4%) 
2,260    (14.8%) 
3,928    (31.9%) 
6,410    (48.6%) 
6,894     (49.5%) 
8,066     (52.8%) 
6,415     (52.2%) 
2,659     (20.1%) 
5,992    (43.1%) 
4,940    (32.4%) 
1,957    (15.9%) 
4,126    (31.3%) 
13,913    (100%) 
15,266    (100%) 
12,300    (100%) 
13,195    (100%) 
Source: Shikata, 1938. 
Note: We present the percent of the total population in parentheses.  
  * In this column, we present the data for the Chungin, Sangmin and Chomin classes together. 
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Table 3. Changes in the ratio of slaves among total population in regions of Kyungsang province (%) 
              
Region 1690 1711 1717 1729/ 
1732 
1765 1786/ 
1789 
1798 1804 1825 1858 1861 1867 
Danseong   27.6   8.8   2.1    
Eonyang  8.2     1.4    0.3  
Ulsan    13.9 2.0   0.92    0. 6 
Daegu 43.1   32.4  15.9    31.3   
Sources: Data on Eonyang from Y. Park, 2007; Data on the Danseong area from K. Han (1982); on Ulsan from 
S. Chong (1983); on Daegu from H. Shikata (1938) 
 
 
 
  
Table 4.  Number of slave transactions during the period 1689-1893, and average age of slaves sold. 
 
Periods # Male transactions  # Female transactions Total number of 
transactions   
1423-1688 -- -- 50 
1689-1710 35      (21.0)  48          (21.8)  83 
1710-1750 69      (15.1) 90          (21.3) 159 
1750-1790 73      (16.3) 92          (20.8) 165 
1790-1820 42      (16.0)       59          (18.9)  101 
1820-1860 28      (13.0) 65          (17.0) 93 
1860-1893 8        (27.3) 25          (13.7) 33 
Whole period 255    (18.1) 379        (18.9) 634 
Sources: The sources of the data for the 15-17th century are displayed in the sources for Appendix B.   
After 1689, data from Appendix B.  
Note: In parentheses, we present the average age of slaves sold. 
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Table 5.  Slave prices: 1650-1893  
 
Year 
 
Female 
        (price in 
Male  
nyang) 
Average slave price 
(nyang) 
Change rates 
in slave price 
(annual average, %)  
Standard 
deviation 
 
1650-1689 102.85 42.00 97.00   
1689-1710  23.90 20.14 20.36 0.14% 3.96 
1710-1750  15.07 12.20 12.28 -1.48% 4.12 
1750-1790  13.47 9.42 11.45 1.63% 4.95 
1790-1820  11.06 7.34 12.43 -3.17% 3.97 
1820-1860  34.16 10.11 19.08 3.78% 2.68 
1860-1893  59.78 12.50 22.84 -0.64% 6.44 
Whole period  27.07 11.95 16.40 0.20% 4.35 
     Sources:  The data for the period 1650-1689 is from Chong (1983) and Lee (1981). For the other periods, the  
data is based on Appendix B.   
 
 
 
Table 6a. The efficiency Regression of G: 1689-1800  
  
 
   The G REGRESSION BEFORE 1800 
 
 
 
Variables  
 
r= 10% 
 
r= 15% 
 
r= 20% 
 
r= 30% 
Dependent variable: G 
 
Constant 
 
-39.26645 
(-1.08) 
 
-31.89922 
(-0.89) 
 
-24.532 
(-0.70) 
 
9.797556-  
 (-0.29) 
 
Time 
 
.0178037 
(0.85) 
 
.0139682 
(0.68) 
 
.0101327 
(0.50) 
 
.0024617 
 (0.13) 
 
2R                         
 
0.0067 
 
0.0043 
 
0.0023 
 
0.0001 
 
Obs     
 
111 
 
111 
 
111 
 
111 
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Table 6b. The efficiency Regression of G: 1800-1893  
 
 
 
The G REGRESSION AFTER 1800 
  
 
Variables  
 
r= 10% 
 
r= 15% 
 
r= 20% 
 
r= 30% 
Dependent variable: G 
 
Constant 
 
722.5338 
(7.33) 
 
705.841 
(7.25) 
 
689.1481 
(7.15) 
 
655.7624 
(6.92) 
 
Time 
 
-.4017272 
(-7.53) 
 
-.3920758 
(-7.44) 
 
-.3824243 
(-7.33) 
 
3631214.-  
(-7.08) 
 
2R                         
 
0.3836 
 
0.3780 
 
0.3714 
 
0.3551 
 
Obs     
 
93 
 
93 
 
93 
 
93 
 
 
 
Table 7. The efficiency Regression of F: 1689-1893  
 
   The F REGRESSION 
 
 
 
Variables  
 
r= 10% 
 
r= 15% 
 
r= 20% 
 
r= 30% 
Dependent variable: F 
 
Constant 
 
-95.94254 
(-3.94) 
 
-101.5906 
(-4.21) 
 
-107.2387 
(-4.47) 
 
-118.535 
(-4.99) 
 
Time 
 
.0082634 
(0.61) 
 
.0119094 
(0.88) 
 
.0155553 
(1.16) 
 
0228472.  
(1.72) 
 
2R                         
 
0.0018 
 
0.0039 
 
0.0067 
 
0.0145 
 
Obs     
 
204 
 
204 
 
204 
 
204 
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Figure 1a. Slave Prices 
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Figure 1b. Rice Prices 
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Figure 1c. Real Price of Slaves 
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Figure 2a. Wages of Free Workers 
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Figure 2b.  Productivity of Slaves 
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Figure 2c. The Value of  the Marginal Product of Slaves 
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Figure 3a. The Arbitrage Asset Equation- G. 
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Figure 3b. The Arbitrage Asset Equation- F. 
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Appendix A. A Brief history of Korea 
2333 BC Founding of the Korean Nation  
57BC- AD 668 Korea ruled by the Three Kindgoms – Goguryeo (north), Baekje 
(Southwest, and Silla (Southeast)  
 
AD 372 Buddhism and Confucianism introduced from China  
668-918 Silla Kingdom rules a unified Korea from its capital Gyeongju  
918-1392 Goryeo dynasty rules Korea – slaves known for celadon pottery  
1231 Mongols conquer Korea and dominate the country for over a century  
1392 Establishment of Joseon dynasty, with Seoul the capital (which 
lasted until 1910). 
 
1443 Invention of Hangeul, Korea's script by scholars working for King 
Sejong 
 
1592-98 Japanese invasions devastate Korea  
1801  Most male government slaves freed  
1876 Korea opens its ports to foreign trade  
1894 Slavery abolished  
1904 Japan defeats Russia. Korea becomes a Japanese protectorate  
1910 Japan annexes Korea and abolishes the monarchy.  
1945 Korea liberated  
1948 Republic of Korea established  
   
Sources: Lee Ki-baik (1984), and  Robinson et al. (2004) 
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Appendix B. Slave prices, and number of slaves transactions             
Number of slaves (ages) Slave price (nyang) 
year-month 
Male Female Price per slave Total Costs of slaves transaction 
  Source 
1689-02 2(24,29)  35 Silver 28 nyang B 
1690-05 1(?) 6(?) 40 Silver 100nyang C 
1692 2(?) 3(73, ?) 11.8 50 A 
1693 1(12)  26.7 20 A 
1693-04  1(15) 17.3 Silver 13 nyang D 
1694-02  2(11,34)  Fabric 17, Cow 1 E 
1696 1(27)  15 15 A 
1696 2(9,21) 2(13,48) 5.7 20 A 
1696-02 1(37)  10 10 B 
1696-05  1(15) 30 30 F 
1696-10  3(2,6,31) 18.8 47 G 
1697-01  1(18) 20 20 C 
1697-02 1(18)  20 20 B 
1697-10 1(?)  15 15 U 
1699-05 1(14)  24 18 B 
1699-12  1(31) 18  18 H 
1699-12  2(23,25)  Rice 30 suk Z 
1700 1(26)  20 20 A 
1700 1(5) 1(40) 28.6 50 A 
1700  1(15) 26.7 20 A 
1701*  1(13) 53.2 40 A 
1701 1(8) 3(13,24,46) 14.3 50 A 
1701 1(45)  10 10 A 
1701-02 1(13)  13.3 10 E 
1702-01 2(13,15) 2(3,39) 12.5 40 U 
1702-04 2(3,14) 4(3,28,31,54)  20, rice 20suk G 
1703 1(41) 1(39) 20 40 A 
1703-10 2(43,47)  30 60 G 
1704-02 1(24) 1(13) 14.3 25 E 
1705 1(14) 1(21) 40 70 A 
1705  1(21) 40 40 A 
1705-03 1(13)  20 15 G 
1707-01 2(4,30) 3(7,25,33) 15.6 70 G 
1708-12  1(17) 20 20 I 
1709 1(7) 2(16,44) 10.9 30 A 
1709-05 1(9)  9.3 7 U 
1710-7  1(7) 27.9 21 Q 
1710 1(28)  20 20 A 
1710-01 1(29) 1(3) 10.3 18 P 
1710-01 1(29) 2(?) 6.6 18 B 
1711  1(11) 26.7 20 A 
1712 4(4,12,23,51) 1(9) 7.1 30 A 
1713-04 2(7, 5) 1(34) 18.3 45 H 
1713* 1(75)  26.7 20 A 
1713  3(6,9,38) 14 35 A 
1713 4(21,48,61,?)  7.5 30 A 
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Appendix B. (continued) 
Number of slaves (ages) Slave price (nyang) 
Year-month 
Male Female Price per slave Total costs of slave transactions 
source 
1715 1(41)  9 9 F 
1716 2(5,12) 3(9,16,43) 14.4 60 A 
1716 1(13)  22.7 17 A 
1716 2(18,30) 2(62,?) 20 80 A 
1717 1(?)  11 11 A 
1717*  1(26) 40 40 A 
1718 2(5,15) 2(11,33) 7.7 25 A 
1718 1(1) 1(22) 7.4 13 A 
1718-01 1(13)  20 15 G 
1719-10 1(19) 2(12,19) 22.2 60 F 
1719  1(62)  Rice 1.7suk A 
1720  1(18) 25 25 A 
1720-08 2(4,7) 2(10,37) 8.6 28 G 
1720-10 1(4) 1(25) 12.8 22 U 
1721-01 1(?)  18 18 G 
1723 1(12) 1(31) 8.6 15 G 
1723 1(3) 3(11,29,35) 5.7 20 A 
1723 1(19)  5 5 A 
1723-03 2(13,45) 2(4,10) 12.5 40 U 
1724-02 1(25)  13 13 A 
1724 1(?)  8 8 K 
1724 1(1) 2(6,27) 6.4 16 A 
1724 1(2) 1(25) 9.1 16 A 
1724-07 1(1) 1(28) 17.7 31 A 
1725 3(?) 4(?) 11.2 70 G 
1725 1(3) 2(8,39) 8 20 B 
1727  2(2,32)  Horse 3 U 
1727-12 3(10,15,17) 2(7,39) 8.2 35 A 
1728  3(2,4,28) 10 25 G 
1728-09  2(2,29) 11.4 20 A 
1728-10 3(?) 11(?) 4.1 50 G 
1729-11 1(?) 2(?) 7.4 20 U 
1730 1(3) 1(27) 22.9 40 G 
1731  1(12) 18.7 14 A 
1732  1(17) 20 20 A 
1732-03  1(14) 8 6 V 
1734-08 1(7) 2(?, 34) 6.7 18 A 
1734 1(6) 1(30) 8.6 15 M 
1735 3(2,10,20) 2(26,52) 3.8 17 A 
1736  1(17) 14 14 A 
1736-03 3(6,8,?) 3(18,22,52) 3.7 20 U 
1736-12 1(?)  6 6 A 
1737  1(17) 20 20 C 
1739-01 1(20)  12 12 A 
1740  1(18) 20 20 D 
1741 1(1) 1(22) 8.6 15 A 
1741-02 2(?) 3(?) 11.3 50 A 
1742 3(5,29,41) 5(4,8,23,32, 61) 5.1 37 A 
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Appendix B. (continued) 
Number of slaves (ages) Slave price (nyang) 
Year-month 
Male Female Price per slave Total costs of slave transactions 
source 
1742-08  1(26) 8 8 V 
1743  1(20) 10 10 A 
1743-02  1(26) 12 12 A 
1744-03 2(5,21) 1(31) 6.6 18 U 
1745-10 1(21)  8 8 D 
1746-01  3(3,7,39) 6 15 J 
1746  1(18) 18 18 D 
1746  1(11) 17.3 13 A 
1747  1(25) 10 10 A 
1749  1(26) 10 10 A 
1749 1(12) 2(2,37) 8 20 A 
1750  3(12,16,39) 10.2 28 A 
1751 2(3,36) 3(1,13,43) 4.9 21 A 
1751 1(25)  7 7 A 
1751 2(4,8) 2(15,37) 6.2 20 A 
1752 1(30) 2(56, ?) 26.7 80 A 
1752-03 4(9,11,14,17) 2(5,41) 6.1 30 U 
1752-03 1(1) 3(7,9,31) 6.3 20 V 
1753  2(11,40) 9.7 17 A 
1754-07 6(?)  19.4 100 U 
1755 1(20) 3(10,18, ?) 10.7 40 A 
1756 1(19) 1(?) 15 30 A 
1756 1(17)  10 10 A 
1757-01  3(?) 2.9 8 D 
1758 1(15) 1(11) 6.7 10 A 
1759 1(25)  11 11 A 
1761 5(2,7,15,43, 45) 4(4,22,24,27) 6.3 50 A 
1761-03 3(17,?) 2(23,49) 6.3 30 E 
1762  1(23) 14 14 A 
1763  1(?) 13 13 A 
1763-01 1(16) 3(2,8,36) 5.2 18 U 
1764  1(18) 16 16 A 
1766  4(1,6,19,32) 14.3 50 A 
1766  1(?) 25 25 A 
1766-03  1(18) 12 12 T 
1767-05  1(?) 10 10 F* 
1769 2(5,7) 2(3,27) 12.3 40 A 
1770 3(25,45,47) 2(17,43) 10 50 A 
1770-12  1(24) 6 6 W 
1770-12 2(?) 2(?) 5.8 20 U 
1770-12 1(?) 2(34,?) 5.6 15 U 
1772-02 2(8,12) 1(15) 13.8 31 D 
1772-03  1(12) 13.3 10 X 
1773  1(22) 30 30 A 
1775-12 1(3) 1(25) 17.3 30 V 
1776 3(10,13,16) 3(5,7,45) 12 60 A 
1777 1(?)  10 10 A 
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Appendix B. (continued) 
Number of slaves (ages) Slave price 
year-month 
Male Female Price per slave Total costs of slave transactions 
source 
1777 6(11,11,14,15,17,20) 4(6,13,46,50) 17.7 150 A 
1779-01 1(23)  11.5 11.5 C 
1782  1(22) 25 25 A 
1782-11 1(4) 1(6) 6.7 10 V 
1782-12 2(2,15) 3(9,21,49) 6.1 27 W 
1783  2(?) 21.1 37 A 
1784-03 1(9) 3(2,6,31) 14.7 33 D 
1784-01 1(?)  8 8 F 
1784-03  1(13) 10.6 8 U 
1785  1(?) 30 30 A 
1785 2(6,15) 1(34) 6 15 A 
1785  1(10) 8 6 A 
1786 4(3,8,12,20) 2(16,47) 9.5 50 A 
1786-08 2(12,26) 3(8,19,50) 17.8 80 E 
1787-02 2(2,7) 1(25) 12 30 T 
1787-10  4(3,7,15,38) 9.4 30 X 
1787 1(6) 2(3,31) 11.2 28 A 
1788-01 1(22)  7 7 V 
1789-02  1(?) 10 10 F 
1789-08 3(16,37,54) 2(8,42) 6.8 32 U 
1789  1(22) 15 15 A 
1790  1(26) 10 10 A 
1792  1(12) 26.7 20 A 
1793-01  1(16) 7 7 V 
1793-01  1(23) 12 12 V 
1793-02  1(?) 27 27 V 
1793-05  1(17) 10 10 I 
1794-01 1(?)  3 3 B 
1795 1(17) 2(4,13) 16 40 A 
1795-09 1(23)  10 10 J 
1797 1(13) 2(9,42) 7.2 18 A 
1798  3(7,10,36) 14 35 A 
1798-04 1(?)  7 7 B 
1799-01 1(?)  4 4 B 
1799-04 4(2,5,23,27)  7.6 26 Y 
1800 1(?)  20 20 A 
1800-04 1(29) 3(4,7,35) 8.7 30 V 
1800-04  2(?) 5.7 10 T 
1801-02  2(7,10) 11.3 17 F 
1801-02 1(18) 1(13) 13.7 24 D 
1801-03  1(?) 5 5 O 
1802-12  2(27, ?) 12.5 25 D 
1804-04  1(?) 27 27 G 
1805 2(2,18) 2(12,42) 17.1 60 A 
1805-06  1(28) 21 21 V 
1807 2(9,28) 4(1,4,11,32) 11 55 A 
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Appendix B. (continued) 
Number of slaves (ages) Slave price (nyang) 
Year-month 
Male Female Price per slave Total costs of slave transactions 
source 
1808 1(9) 3(6,13,40) 13.9 45 A 
1809  1(13) 26.7 20 A 
1809-12 4(?)  10 35 D 
1809-12 2(?) 3(?) 4.4 20 P 
1810-02 2(12, ?) 2(23,45,) 8.1 30 N 
1810-03 2(37,43)  2.5 5 V 
1810-03 2(4,5) 4(7,21,?,?) 3.7 18 V 
1810-03 2(15,17) 1(49) 3.8 10 V 
1810  1(14) 14.7 11 A 
1811-02 2(?) 1(?) 9.3 25 P 
1811 1(19)  8 8 A 
1812 1(19)  8 8 A 
1812-03 2(?)  15.2 26 U 
1812-11  2(12,25) 11.7 20 F 
1812-11  4(4,8,15,46) 10.8 35 D 
1813-02 1(?)  10 10 B 
1814-11  1(15) 10 10 H 
1814  1(15) 20 15 A 
1814  2(19,29) 25 50 A 
1817-01 1(30)  7 7 F 
1822 1(16)  14 14 A 
1822 1(23) 1(20) 25 50 A 
1822 1(16)  16 16 A 
1822-11 1(32) 1(20) 12.5 25 U 
1824  1(21) 80 80 A 
1825-01 2(5,15) 1(49) 7.6 19 D 
1825-02 1(29)  10 10 F 
1825-12  1(19) 35 35 V 
1826  1(10) 46.7 35 A 
1827-05 1(2) 3(8,10,31) 35.4 115 P 
1829-01 1(14)  8 6 P 
1829-05 1(?)  10 10 F 
1831-06 2(1,4) 3(7,9,35) 17.3 69 B 
1832 2(4,13) 3(7,11,35) 12.5 50 A 
1833-05 1(20)  11 11 P 
1833  4(2,6,9,36) 3.1 10 A 
1833 1(12) 4(4,4,9,16) 11.3 45 A 
1833  1(16) 40 40 A 
1833  1(18) 45 45 A 
1833-12  1(13) 46.6 35 U 
1834*  1(21) 80 80 A 
1834-01  1(14) 39.9 30 U 
1836  1(19) 50 50 A 
1836-01  1(16) 45 45 U 
1837-12 1(24)  9 9 M 
1837  1(25) 20 20 A 
1837  2(2,23) 14.3 25 A 
1838  1(?) 19 19 A 
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Appendix B. (continued) 
Number of slaves (ages) Slave price (nyang) 
Year-month 
Male Female Price per slave Total costs of slave transactions 
source 
1839-12 2(5,10) 1(37) 17 25 P 
1839  2(?) 57.1 100 A 
1840  1(13) 24 18 A 
1840  1(17) 20 20 A 
1840  1(13) 20 15 A 
1840-12 1(25)  8 8 B 
1841  1(15) 17.3 13 A 
1842-03  1(17) 15 15 C 
1843-09 1(?)  6 6 F 
1843  1(10) 49.3 37 A 
1844-09  1(?) 25 25 P 
1844-02  1(12) 53.2 40 U 
1844  1(18) 40 40 A 
1844  2(7,25) 21.1 37 A 
1846  1(19) 16 16 A 
1846  2(?) 37.1 65 A 
1849-11 2(8,14) 2(4,45) 10.8 35 C 
1850  1(11) 37.3 28 A 
1851-12  1(22) 15 15 U 
1852  1(10) 46.7 35 A 
1852 1(?) 2(36, ?) 6.5 18 A 
1853 2(14, ?) 3(37, ?, ?) 4 18 A 
1853 1(31)  3 3 A 
1855 1(4) 1(29) 14.3 25 A 
1856  1(?) 10 10 A 
1860*  1(17) 107 107 A 
1860*  1(13) 107 80 A 
1861  1(8) 46.7 35 A 
1864-11  2(?) 34.5 59 Y 
1866-05 1(12)  20 15 T 
1867  2(?) 80 140 A 
1869-06*  1(18) 100 100 U 
1871-05  1(15) 39.9 30 U 
1872-08*  1(?) 100 100 U 
1873-10  2(2, ?) 10 20 D 
1876-07  1(10) 26.7 20 T 
1876-12*  1(20) 150 150 U 
1877-02  1(12) 93.1 70 Y 
1877-03  1(14) 18.7 14 P 
1877-04 4(?) 4(?) 28.6 200 C 
1877-12  1(13) 20 15 U 
1878-07*  1(11) 133 100 U 
1879-12*  1(11) 133 100 U 
1884-04  1(14) 21.3 16 P 
1885-05  1(11) 16 12 G 
1888-12 1(?)  5 5 T 
1891-10 1(37) 1(29) 50 100 H 
1893* 1(33) 1(6) 657 1150 A 
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Data sources : The different sources are presented with their codes: Old Records of GyujangGak - (A); Old Records of KyungPook- (B); Old Records of 
Uisung Kim’s Family - (C); Old Records of Youngnam- (D); Old Records of Buan Kim’s Family- (E); Old Records of KyungJoo Choi’s Family - (F); Old Records 
of Haenam Yoon’s Family - (G); Old Records from the Tenri univ. - (H); Old Records of Kwangsan Kim’s Family in Ocheon - (I); Old Records of Jaenyeong Lee’s 
Family - (J); Old Records of Poongsan Ryu’s Family - (K); Old Records of Damyang Ha’s Family - (L); Old Records of Jinsung Lee’s Family - (M); Old Records of 
Moonhwa Yoo’s Family - (N); Old Records of Haenam Kim’s Family - (O); Old Records of YoungHae Lee’s Family - (P); Old Records from the Kyoto University 
of Japan(Q); A Law of Ruling Country (KyungKook DaeJeon in Korean) - (R); A Second Law of Ruling Country (Sok DaeJeon in Korean)- (S); Old Records from 
Youngnam univ - (T); Old Records from Cheonbuk Univ.- (U); Old Records from Onekwang univ.- (V); Old Records from Sooncheon Univ.- (W); Old Records 
from ChjeonJu History Museum - (X); Old Records from the Song Mano’s Family - (Y); Old Records from Mokpo Univ.- (Z).   
Note: Years with asterisk means that slave data were not used to obtain series of slave prices, since slaves were sold for a specific purpose 
such as second wife, or secretary. 
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Appendix C. Slave price, rice price, productivity, and wages  
 
Year 
Slave price 
(nyang) 
 
Rice price 
(nyang/suk) 
Slave 
productivity 
(suk per person) 
Monthly 
Wage 
(nyang ) 
Year 
Slave price 
(nyang) 
Rice price 
(nyang/suk) 
slave  
productivity 
(suk per person) 
Monthly Wage 
(nyang) 
1689 35  10.95   1733  3.0 8.70  
1690 40 2.5 8.95 6.8 1734 7.6 1.5 9.15  
1691   9.33   1735 3.8  10.33 6.8 
1692 11.8  9.47   1736 7.9 1.15 9.22  
1693 22  11.70   1737 20 0.83 5.85  
1694    6.8 1738  1.78 4.94  
1695   6.42 6.4 1739 12  13.01 7.6 
1696 15.9  10.08 6.8 1740 20  10.71 6.8 
1697 18.3 0.64 7.69   1741 9.9    
1698   10.49 6.8 1742 6.5 1.5 10.78  
1699 21   7.7 1743 11 1 4.23  
1700 25.1 1.5    1744 6.6  9.73 7.3 
1701 12.5  11.23 8.1 1745 8 1.5 6.52 6.8 
1702 12.5  9.03 6.8 1746 13.8 1.19 6.99  
1703 25  12.90   1747 10 0.97 7.19 6.8 
1704 14.3     1748  1.34 9.27  
1705 33.3 1.28 8.06 6.8 1749 9 0.89 7.23  
1706   11.70   1750 10.2 1.27 8.76  
1707 15.6  11.95   1751 6 1.44  7.3 
1708 20  7.67   1752 13.03 1.63 8.63 6.9 
1709 10.1 1.75 9.19   1753 9.7 1.13 8.62 7.3 
1710 16.2  14.04   1754 19.4 1 8.37  
1711 26.7  9.92   1755 10.7 1.5  6.8 
1712 7.1  12.39   1756 12.5 2.5  6.8 
1713 12.2 1.6 7.49 6.8 1757 2.9 0.87  7.3 
1714  2.26 6.47   1758 6.7 1.03   
1715 9 1.5 11.07 8 1759 11 1.21  6.4 
1716 19.03 1.93 7.10   1760  1.16   
1717 11 1.72 9.00   1761 6.3 1.38   
1718 11.7 1.28 8.89 7.3 1762 14 2.8  7.3 
1719 22.2 1.3 9.29 6.8 1763 9.1 3.13   
1720 15.4  5.25 7.3 1764 16 1.37 7.03 7.4 
1721 18  8.17   1765  1.55   
1722  1.85  6.8 1766 17.1 1.37   
1723 7.95 1.86    1767 10 1.78   
1724 10.8 1.16 10.40 7.3 1768  1.9   
1725 9.9 0.63 6.12 6.4 1769 12.3 1.81   
1726  2.35 7.71 6.8 1770 6.85 1.11  6.4 
1727 8.2  7.15 6.8 1771  1.67   
1728 8.5 0.9 8.31 8.4 1772 13.55 1.63  8.4 
1729 7.4 1.67 10.23   1773  3.26   
1730 22.9 1.50 9.97 7.3 1774  1.65   
1731 18.7  3.48  1775 17.3 1.51   
1732 14  5.68 6.8 1776 12 1.55 7.71 8.1 
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Appendix C. (continued) 
Year 
Slave price 
(nyang) 
Rice price 
(nyang/suk) 
Slave  
productivity 
(suk per person) 
Monthly 
Wage 
(nyang ) 
Year 
 Slave price 
(nyang) 
Rice price 
(nyang/suk) 
Slave 
productivity 
(suk per person) 
Monthly Wage 
(nyang) 
1777 13.9 1.44 8.43 6.8 1821  2.44  7.3 
1778  2.03 5.46 5.8 1822 16.8 2.74  7.7 
1779 11.5 1.86 5.84  1823  2.1  6.8 
1780  1.5 8.58  1824  2.06   
1781  1.46 4.59  1825 17.5 1.8  6.8 
1782 12.6 2.11 3.73  1826  1.93   
1783 21.1 2.52 6.53 7.6 1827 35.4 2   
1784 11.1 1.88 6.46 8.4 1828  3.27   
1785 14.7 1.24 5.18  1829 9.0 3.17   
1786 13.7 1.97 3.67 7.6 1830  2.09  7.6 
1787 10.86 1.16 5.45 8.4 1831 17.3 2.15   
1788 7 1.63   1832 12.5 2.33  6.8 
1789 10.6 2.3  8.4 1833 26.1 3.35   
1790 10 1.72   1834 59.9 2.07 7.50 7.9 
1791  1.43   1835    8.1 
1792 26.7 2.48   1836 47.5   7.3 
1793 14 3.15   1837 14.4   7.3 
1794 3 2.15  8.7 1838 19    
1795 13 2.2  8.7 1839 6.6 2.1   
1796  1.51   1840 18  9.00  
1797 7.2 2.02   1841 17.3 1.99 13.50  
1798 10.5 3.28   1842 15 1.8 19.50  
1799 5.8 2.8   1843 27.6 2  7.6 
1800 11.4 1.72  7.3 1844 34.8 2   
1801 10.0 1.9   1845  1.5   
1802 12.5   7.3 1846 16 1.4 10.50 8.4 
1803     1847  1.97 9.30  
1804 27 1.3  6.8 1848  1.58  7.5 
1805 18.4 1.15  7.5 1849 10.8 1.22  7.6 
1806     1850 37.3 1.46   
1807 11 1.7  7.3 1851 15  13.50 7.3 
1808 13.9 1.91   1852 53.2  19.50 7.3 
1809 13.7 1.56   1853 3.5    
1810 6.17 2.2  6.9 1854  1.5   
1811 8.6    1855 14.3  7.92 8.1 
1812 11.4 2.1   1856 10 1.64 11.55 8.4 
1813 10 2.47   1857  1.7 6.00 7.7 
1814 18.3 3.23   1858  3.37 4.71 8 
1815  5.55  7.6 1859  4 9.84 7.3 
1816  2.69   1860     
1817 7 1.4   1861 46.7 3 9.42 7.5 
1818  1.4  6.8 1862  4.09 5.55  
1819  2.1   1863  3.79 3.75 7.8 
1820  2.11   1864 34.5  12.00  
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Appendix C. (continued) 
Year 
 Slave price 
(nyang) 
Rice price 
(nyang/suk) 
Slave 
productivity 
(suk per person) 
Monthly 
Wage 
(nyang ) 
Year 
Slave price 
(nyang) 
Rice price 
(nyang/suk) 
Slave  
productivity 
(suk per person) 
Monthly Wage 
(nyang) 
1865    9.45 7.3 1881   7.20  
1866 15 5.19 10.65  1882  7.45   
1867  3.14 9.45  1883  6.26   
1868  3.13 7.71  1884 21.3 10.52   
1869  7.65 5.22  1885 16 9.25   
1870  7.1 9.42  1886  8.72 7.20  
1871 39.9 4.3 10.05  1887  6.93 7.62  
1872  4.49 11.13  1888 5 6.5 6.60  
1873 10 4.55 12.00  1889  7.48 7.71  
1874   7.74  1890  5.72  7.3 
1875   7.26  1891 50 5.87 7.26  
1876 26.7 6.22   1892  7.5 4.80 7.3 
1877 40.1  9.84  1893  14.75 7.00  
1878   9.00 7.6      
1879  5.94        
1880   6.00 7.3      
Sources: Slave prices are yearly average from Appendix B.  Rice price and productivity are for the Kyungsang area. Rice price data are quoted from Y.Lee 
and E.Park (2004) and from Joseon Dynasty Record (Sillok), and wage data are from EuiGeo, quoted from E.Park (2004). 
  
  
  
 
 
 
  
 
